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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

:

DIANE MARIE NELSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970163-CA
Priority No. 2

:

INTRODUCTION
Nelson claimed in Point I of her Opening Brief that the
trial court failed to determine the reliability of the eyewitness
identification and make appropriate findings of fact prior to
trial as required by Article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution and State v Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) .
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the
identification on the grounds that the showup was prejudicially
suggestive and the identification unreliable.

At the hearing on

the motion to suppress defense counsel indicated that he believed
the State intended to submit the preliminary hearing transcript.
R. 161-62.

Defense counsel stated that he too would be relying

on portions of the transcript as well.

R. 161-62.

Defense

counsel also made a proffer as to the testimony of Dr. Dodd, an
expert in eye witness identifications.

R. 168-69.

Though the

State filed a motion and memorandum in opposition to Nelson's
motion to suppress, the State never submitted the transcript of

the preliminary hearing into evidence.

1

The State's failure

to submit any evidence at the hearing is explained by the fact
that the trial court indicated at the outset its belief that the
issue of reliability was essentially one for the jury.2
63.

R. 162-

The trial court made it quite clear to defense counsel that

he need not waste his time putting Dr. Dodd on the stand because
the court had already ruled on the matter.

R. 167-68.

State now claims that Nelson waived the issue.

The

See State's

Opening Brief, pg. 11-12.
Lastly, though the State concedes on page 21 of its
Opening Brief that challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
do not require preservation, Nelson invited error and/or waived
the issue.
ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE HER RIGHT TO REQUIRE
THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE A THRESHOLD DETERMINATION
OF THE RELIABILITY OF THE EYE WITNESS
IDENTIFICATION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE I, SECTION 7
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Contrary to the State's suggestion, Nelson did request an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to Ramirez.

R. 17. At that point,

the burden was on the State to demonstrate the reliability of the
1

.
The burden is on the prosecution to demonstrate the
admissibility of the eyewitness identification. Ramirez, 817 P.2d
at 778.
2

. On page twelve of its Brief, the State argues that because
the trial court did review the facts recited in the prosecutor's
memorandum in opposition to Nelson's motion to suppress, the
requirements of Ramirez were met. The prosecutor's memorandum is
not, however, a substitute for an evidentiary hearing as the
"facts" recited in a memorandum are not evidence.
2

identification.

The State never had to meet its burden because

the trial court ruled that the issue was one for the jury without
hearing any evidence.

Once the trial court had ruled, Nelson

was not required to again request a Ramirez hearing to preserve
the claim.
The State's reliance on State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332
(Utah 1993) to support its claim that Nelson must ask for a
pretrial hearing to suppress the identification twice to preserve
her claim is misguided.

In Olsen, the defendant failed all

together to object to the reliability of the eye witness
identification.

Id. at 335.

Unlike, Olsen, in this case Nelson

did file the appropriate motion, and that motion was denied.
17.

R.

It is unclear just what the State expects defense counsel to

do to preserve the claim in addition to filing the appropriate
motion.
The State also erroneously relies on State v. Lopez, 886
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994) to support its claim that Nelson waived her
request for a pretrial determination of the reliability of the
identification.

Like Olsen, the defendant in Lopez never asked

the trial court to consider the admissibility of the
identification under the Utah Constitution.
claim was deemed waived.

Id. at 1113.

Consequently, the

Olsen is therefore

distinguishable from this case because Nelson did request a
hearing and ruling on the reliability of the identification under
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution prior to trial.
II. NELSON DID NOT INVITE ERROR OR WAIVE ANY
CHALLENGE TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.
3

The State concedes that challenges to the sufficiency of
the evidence do not require preservation.
Brief, pg. 21.

See State's Opening

However, the State asserts that counsel argued a

contrary position to his claim on appeal that the State failed to
establish that Nelson intended for the accomplice to use a knife
in the commission of the offense.
supported by the record.

Id.

This assertion is not

Defense counsel argued at the close of

the State's case that the charge against Nelson should be
dismissed because the State did not establish that she encouraged
the accomplice to use a weapon.

R. 3 74-75.

The trial court

denied the motion on the grounds that the law does not require
that the defendant know that the accomplice will use a dangerous
weapon.

R. 377-78.
The State apparently believes that despite the trial

court's ruling, counsel must request a jury instruction contrary
to the trial judge's interpretation of the law to avoid inviting
error.

Given the trial court's rejection of defense counsel's

argument, it was appropriate to agree not to argue the point
before the jury.
Lastly, the State's assertion that defense counsel never
asked the trial court to consider the argument that Nelson had to
intend the use of a knife and somehow misled the court on that
issue is incorrect.

At the close of the State's case defense

counsel argued:
You know, and it sort of leads me to the next
argument I wanted to make before the jury comes
in, and that would be an argument, obviously,
that the state has not shown a prima facie case.

4

If they don't believe that she committed an
aggravated robber, i.e. that she didn't have the
knife, that she didn't encourage the use of the
knife, or intend to use the knife, then this, as
an alternative to that, then this simply ought to
go to the jury as a robbery.
R. 374-75.
purposes.

The invited error doctrine has two principal
First, the trial court should be given an opportunity

to address a claim of error.

"Second, it discourages parties

from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a
hidden ground for reversal on appeal."

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d

1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).
In this case, defense counsel raised the issue of what
constitutes the necessary mens rea and argued it at trial.

The

trial court considered the argument and rejected defendant's
interpretation of the law.

The trial court was not misled, and

counsel did not "hide" the issue for a surprise attack on appeal.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing and as set forth in her initial
Opening Brief, Nelson respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the conviction and judgment entered in the trial court and
remand the case to the trial court either for a new trial, or
with orders to dismiss for insufficient evidence.
SUBMITTED this ^S^

day of October, 1997.

REBECCA C. HYDE
Attorney for Defendant/
Appellant
5
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